As the Federal Government takes fresh steps to contain the myriads of security challenges facing the nation, particularly killing by the Boko Haram group, Group Politics Editor, Taiwo Adisa, examines the deeper and largely unreported angle to the emergence, development and establishment of the deadly sect over time and across a number of states in the North.

PRESIDENT Goodluck Jonathan appeared to underscore the operational basis of the radical Islamic sect, Boko Haram, on Thursday when he declared that the group is a faceless organisation, whose demands are unknown to the government. In an interview granted to the wired service, Reuters and published in Nigerian papers, Jonathan declared that the possibility of dialogue with the sect was remote because its demands were unknown and the group itself, faceless.

“If anybody invited Osama bin Laden (to talks), he wouldn’t have appeared ... Boko Haram, if you invite them, they will not come. They operate without a face, they operate without a clear identity; so, it is difficult to interface with such a group.

“That is the greatest difference between Boko Haram ... and the Niger Delta issue,” Jonathan said, adding that: “If they clearly identify themselves now and say this is the reason we are resisting; this is the reason we are confronting government or this is the reason we destroy some innocent people and their properties ... then, there will be a basis for dialogue.

“We will dialogue; let us know their problems and we will solve them, but if they don’t identify themselves, who will you dialogue with?”

The president’s declarations goes to further confirm the widely held positions that political influences and religious extremism built on prevailing socio-economic circumstances in parts of the country are providing the needed fuel for the spread of the Boko Haram insurgency.

Earlier in the week, an online publication, 247Ureports had quoted a leading member of the Islamic sect as also providing some of the closest insights into the basis of operations of the Boko Haram. The unnamed source was quoted in the report as claiming that the sect has ongoing relationships with many Northern governors, adding that  ”Most of them pay us monthly to leave their states alone.”

The report further indicated that in Kano State, the former state governor, Mallam Ibrahim Shekarau had reached an agreement with the group in late 2004 for monthly disbursement of N5 million, which was later, jerked up to N10 million in 2009. According to the report, the agreement included provision of institutional infrastructural support through the Hisbah [Islam police] project which received yearly budgetary allocation of N1.01 billion in the state. It claimed that the victory of governor Rabiu Musa Kwakwanso in the April 2011 election altered the agreement as the new administration dismantled Hisbah set up and disowned the monthly N10 million disbursement.

The report also claimed that Bauchi State governor, Mallam, Isa Yuguda, had reached an agreement with the leadership of the group and that a monthly disbursement of N10 million was agreed upon, while the sect used the several mountains scattered around Bauchi as training grounds. The governor was also said to have given the sect protection against arrests by the Federal Government. While that agreement was said to have been reached in June 2008, Governor Yuguda was, however, said to have stopped the said monthly disbursement by mid 2011.

Spokesman to Governor Yuguda, Ishola Michael, has, however, denied involvement of his boss in the acclaimed Boko Haram deal.

Similarly, the Secretary to the State Government (SSG) in Bauchi State, Mr. Ahmed Ibrahim Dandija, vehemently denied that the state government had anything to do with the sect in a statement issued on Thursday.

The online report further quoted the unnamed Boko Haram source as saying that “the northern governors are overwhelmed. They are aware of the capabilities of the Boko Haram operatives operating in their respective states. Some of the state government officials visit the terrorist groups in their training camps to watch the training exercises. “We train harder than the Nigerian military and they see it.”

Notwithstanding the denials coming on the heels of the revelations contained in the report, indications emerged that some agencies of government have been able to piece together information in such direction, even before the online publication made public its report.

For instance, findings by Sunday Tribune indicated that reports emanating from the State Security Services (SSS) and other intelligence organisations had confirmed that some covert relationships existed between members of the sect and some top government officials.

A report had indicated of the setting up of a team of security experts to quiz a serving governor and some top Northern political personalities over the rising wave of Boko Haram activities. The report had indicated that the sect enjoys subtle patronage of government officials, even before the arrest of its second-in-command, Kabiru Umar (a.k.a. Kabiru Sokoto), in the chalets of Borno Governor’s Lodge in Asokoro, Abuja. Some reports have also confirmed that the leader of the Islamic sect, Abubakar Shekau, is believed to be hiding in Niger Republic, contrary to indications that he fled to Cameroon. It was indicated that some operatives were at the verge of bursting him, prompting his hurried escape to Niger.

Besides, reports said to have been pieced together by a coalition of security agencies also gave insights into the growing popularity of the Boko Haram insurgency, indicating that the porous nature of Nigerian/Chadian and Nigerien borders, as well as language, religious and cultural affinities have created clear fertile ground for fundamentalists in Northern Nigeria.

Apart from religious and language affinities with countries on the Northern borders, exposure to fundamentalism by Nigerians in Borno, Bauchi, Kano, Yobe, Adamawa and Taraba axis has been traced to poverty as well as political influences.

It has been confirmed that politics was rife in the growth of Boko Haram in Borno under the administration of former Governor Ali Modu Sherrif.

The late founder of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yussuff, had been sent packing from Kano, where he was said to have originally began his preaching. He was said to have disagreed with a popular preacher in the ancient city of Kano and then got dislodged to Borno.

But Borno was also said to be hostile to Yusuf and he relocated to Chad only for him to have returned  as a result of the plan to use the group for political purposes. On his return to Borno, the popularity rose and upon the victory of Senator Modu Sheriff, the group became more popular until the open disagreement leading eventually to the killing of Yusuff in police custody in 2009.

If the sect festered in Borno as a result of documented political influence, the issue of Kano and other states could, however, provide some puzzle. A mix of politics and religion was said to have been responsible for the spread of Boko Haram in the other states.

While it was learnt that the activities were not really resident in Adamawa and that they were being imported to the state, ostensibly for political reasons, the situation in Kano is a bit complex.

But claims contained in the report by the online publication appear to capture the situation. A broken promise and the emergence of a new governor on the seat meant the marginalisation of the Hisbah, which hitherto provided jobs for some youths who believed they were soldiers of the religion. Once they got thrown out of jobs, they landed in the ready hands of fundamentalist groups which had its roots in the city of Kano in the early days of Mohammed Yusuff. If claims contained in the online report on Kano are anything to go by, the state might have unwittingly funded fundamentalism which today is hunting many. As contained in the report, the state gave a yearly N1.01 billion budget to the Hisbah set up, while also providing a monthly N10 million donation to the sect. The question to ask is what does the state, which allegedly provided N10 million on monthly basis to the sect, expect it to do with the money? Some security experts are of the view that some leaders of the groups involved could easily use the money to fund foreign training of many Nigerians and Chadians in Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia and that when such elements return after their training, they unleash terror on perceived enemies.

As a security expert puts it, the tricky aspect of Boko Haram insurgency is that while political leaders may not directly fund an operation, they are in joy anytime the nation’s security is breached as to them; it is another avenue to showcase the inadequacies of the “unwanted” Jonathan-led administration.