Boko Haram: A faceless voice

Newsflash

Opinion

Boko Haram: A faceless voice

Written by Oluremi Isaacs Monday, 30 January 2012

THE unabating threat to the body fabric of the nation attained new depths with the carnage wreaked in the ancient city of Kano, northern Nige-ria. In what can only be described as a deranged attack, there appeared neither rhyme nor reason to the type of violence, or the quantum. To an untrained or compartmentalised eye, what appears mindless however is more likely than not in part of a premeditated set of building blocks, born of minds with clear and unalloyed intent.

Terrorism properly understood is a political tool, albeit one regarded as despicable and viewed with disdain by those that engage at a more conventional political plane. To the degree that terror is employed and deployed as a means to achieve clearly conceived political ends, this observation is a legitimate one. From the murder of Archduke Ferdinand in 1914 that lit a torch of violence that took Europe and much of the rest of the world to the edge, through al Qaeda to the activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army, political agendas have been an ever present in the terrorist’s raison d’etre.

With terror however, there may, and often are ostensible goals and subterranean ones, which are truly in play may be the key to shaping appropriate responses. In this new information age, responsibility is quickly claimed for acts of violence, ensuring that those across the political divide are left in no doubt of “the reasons” for the violent act.

Such reasons may be very specific, such as the release of political (sic) prisoners, or they may be even more broad and nebulous agendas such as the bringing into being of a state founded on theocratic convictions. The reasons for the violence may on the other hand remain obscured or partly obscured, so as to either allow their true objective to remain hidden until such time as they are ready to come out of the closet, and sometimes to enable real sponsors and perpetrators to engage at both political levels, simultaneously. In such instances, appropriate responses are infinitely harder to craft as the currencies of exchange are both multiple and multifarious.

Aside from the somewhat muddling nomenclature of its plumage (No to Western education), Boko Haram’s declared intent is to bring about an Islamic state in northern Nigeria. Having nailed its colours to that particular mast, we are continually invited to don those lenses every time we are confronted with a new outrage. It would be just as judicious however to always be prepared to look beyond and beneath Boko Haram’s declared objectives for additional causes that may have become wedded to it.

Part of the political folklore behind the terror-as-a-means-of-effecting-political-change equation is that the agenda is one that has support amongst a broader political constituency, who are either too timid or too intimidated to advance their own interests and beliefs. Such a scenario casts the terrorist groups as the fearless face (behind a literal mask) of a latent and passive conviction.

How effectively do these tools of understanding travel when applied to the menace that is Boko Haram? The question is particularly germane in the aftermath of the wide scale carnage rained down on the people and city of Kano, as many voices are raised asking whom exactly the faceless voices of Boko Haram are.

Is there a groundswell of support in the North of Nigeria for a separate northern Nigerian state? Is there widespread support for a theocratic state in northern Nigeria? The questions as posited carry in them the seeds of their denouement. The consensus view seems to be that while Boko Haram may have dedicated and even fanatical followers, it is not a movement with widespread appeal. What little appeal it did have was done enormous and I would venture, irreparable damage by the Kano disaster.

Over the last five decades, and more rapidly over the last 30 years, we have seen the idea of a northern monolith gradually eroded and rendered of limited use as a means of analysing the country’s politics. Given that northern Nigeria has always been a disparate body of peoples, interests and viewpoints, the idea of a region-wide consensus that ought to piggy-back an existing violent movement is patently ludicrous.

The Obasanjo presidency represented a compromise of sorts; a necessary means of assuaging the disenchantment and feelings of being cheated out of the June 12 1993 elections results that were the prevalent political strain in western Nigeria. The seismic shifts in the political landscape that the coming of a President Jonathan required of a northern elite, accustomed to near-total domination of the levers of political power however has been for many, a bridge too far.

For those faceless elements intent on ensuring that the ancient regime does not disappear without trace, the changes may have forced new thinking; and, Boko Haram may have appeared a convenient tiger to ride. Their elemental fears were signalled even before Jonathan came into office during the election campaign, with promises to make the country “ungovernable” if the North failed to gain the Presidency. While much of this was dismissed as hyperbole, the heightened speed of the descent into barbarism and political stalemate means that we cannot leave any options off the table in seeking to answer why.

With President Jonathan’s presidency have come further fundamental changes in the personnel configuration of our politics, dealing a death blow to the presumption that certain posts are the preserve of particular parts of the country. The new dawn has brought with it degrees of cognitive dissonance that must have proved easier for some to adjust to than for others. There is nothing unique in this, change is rarely seamless and given where we have been, it is no surprise that where we must go (and the process is still very much a work-in-progress) will be conflictual.

It would be naive and sentimental to disavow the possibility that discontented and disruptive elements may be using Boko Haram for their own objectives, the opportunity existed and continues to exist. What is unacceptable and not to be tolerated is a situation where those that refuse to accept change can throw their toys (read improvised incendiary devices and other things that go bang) out of the pram and ask the rest of us to pick up after them.

It would be a sad and dangerous day indeed were we to accept that “northern” problems need “northern” personnel to solve them. Boko Haram is a scourge and we cannot accept it as an excuse to further travel down the road of disintegration. Those that seek to use it as the thin edge of a divisive wedge ought to be subject to the closest of scrutiny, to ensure that they have declared any conflicts of interest.

It would be perfectly understandable if government’s response was to be an unsheathed iron fist, terrorist activity cannot and must not be accommodated. It is also true however that the Boko Haram challenge is an extant one and one that must be engaged at multiple levels. The absence of the oxygen of political support must be demonstrated by partnering with the broader Muslim community in a manner that reinforces the isolated and marginal nature of the movement. By so doing, the movement will be further viewed as inimical to the broader interests of both Muslims and northern Nigerians. It would also constrain the opportunity for it to be used as a Trojan horse.

Isaacs writes from Surulere, Lagos.

Set as favorite

Bookmark

Email this

Comments (1) Add Comment