As Nigeria’s golden jubilee anniversary looms, there are as many Nigerians who would rather reel off a litany of their unfulfilled dreams than roll out drums to celebrate. Corrupt and inept leadership, epileptic power supply, the parlous state of the infrastructure, the dying industries and the poorly organised elections are but a few among the much blight on the nation’s report sheet. So, why is a country that is close to 50 years still stumbling like a toddler? What indeed is there to celebrate?

Before independence in 1960, the economy was characterised by the dominance of exports and commercial activities. There was no viable industrial sector. After independence, agriculture continued as the mainstay of the economy. In spite of fluctuations in world prices, agriculture contributed about 65 per cent to GDP and represented almost 70 per cent of total exports. Agriculture provided the foreign exchange that was utilised in importing raw materials and capital goods. The peasant farmers produced enough to feed the entire population. The various marketing boards generated much revenue, the surplus of which was used by government to develop the basic infrastructure needed for long term development. The main thrust of policy was to maximise the benefits of the export-led development strategy.

Raw materials, comprising agricultural produce and minerals were exported to the industrialised nations.

The industrial sector continued on the pioneer industries schemes of the 1950s. Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) strategy was adopted. Consequently, various consumer items which were hitherto imported, were produced domestically. Protective measures like tariffs, quotas, etc. were in place to ensure that domestic industries were allowed to grow.

In the short run, jobs were created, although the industries were, to some extent, unnecessarily protected by government. Generally, the finished products of the protected industries were less competitive compared with their foreign counterparts. Of course, that did not decrease domestic demand for them. However, Nigerian industrialists did not take advantage of the various protective measures put in place by government by investing to enhance competitiveness of local products.

During this period, the rates of inflation, unemployment and productivity remained relatively acceptable. Policy favoured tight demand management. Increased productivity kept prices reasonably stable within the economy. The unemployment rate was around 1.5 per cent and was most visible among primary and secondary school leavers.

The 1962-1968 First National Development Plan ensured that the state participated in economic activities, directly and indirectly. The Plan argued that government must provide the necessary infrastructure. Furthermore, due to the vicious circle of poverty, government provided investable funds in order to accelerate the rate of economic development. Private savings were still very low, hence, the low rate of private investment.

The gap between the rich and the poor, though not quite visible, began to emerge. A class of traders, commission agents and contractors started to appear. The manufacturing, trading and services sub-sectors were still controlled by non-Nigerians. Most of the big companies were branches of multinationals with no sign of Nigerianisation until the mid-1960s when some Nigerians began to occupy senior positions in a few multinational companies.

Before the oil-boom, the economy was characterized by the predominance of subsistence and commercial activities; narrow disarticulated production base, with ill-adapted technology; neglected informal sector; lopsided development due to the bias of public policies; openness and excessive dependence on external factor inputs; continuous siphoning of surpluses from the economy; and weak institutional capabilities. The various policies of the pro-oil boom era "failed" to address these identified features of the economy.

In 1971, the share of agriculture to GDP stood at 48.23 per cent. By 1977, it had declined to almost 21 per cent. Agricultural exports, as a percentage of total exports, which was 20.7 per cent in 1971, reduced to 5.71 per cent in 1977. The discovery of oil in commercial quantity in the mid-1950s, coupled with the oil-boom resulting from the Arab oil embargo on the USA in 1973, affected the agricultural sector adversely. The economy became heavily dependent on oil. By this time, oil revenue represented almost 90 per cent of foreign exchange earnings and about 85 per cent of total exports.

While the boom afforded the government much needed revenue, it also created serious structural problems in the economy.

The agricultural sector was most hit. Rural urban migration increased, as people attempted to reap or benefit from the windfall from oil. Production of agricultural commodities for export declined. Food production became a problem. Starting from 1974, the economy became a net importer of basic foods. Huge foreign exchange earnings were utilised in importing food. Nonetheless, prices of foodstuff remained high. Policies like the government's Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) programme could not reverse the deteriorating food situation. Government was involved in direct food production, provided subsidies to peasant farmers and created more commodity boards for various agricultural and food products. The growth rate of GDP was quite high, such that a growth rate of 10.5 per cent in 1976 was considered unimpressive. Government expenditure fuelled the inflation rate. Between 1975 and 1976, the rate of inflation reached 23 per cent. It reduced to 16 per cent in 1976 and 1977. For the same periods, unemployment rate was 4.3 per cent and 2 per cent respectively. The discomfort index in 1976 stood at 27.3 per cent.

The neo-Keynesian type management of the economy was glaring during this period. Policy makers advised the government not only to embark on ownership and control of the commanding heights of the economy like the petroleum and mining sectors, but also to be directly involved in banking, insurance, clearing and forwarding, among others. With the promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree in 1972, government became directly involved in virtually all aspects of the economy, especially as foreign exchange was thought to be no longer a constraint to development.

This era had its problems. Primitive accumulation intensified. Corruption, theft, real estate speculation, outright looting of government treasury and other fraudulent practices prevailed. The State, on its own, intensified the creation of a business class that depended solely on government contracts rather than on production. The gap between the rich and the poor widened considerably. Ad-hoc and ill-conceived government policies exacerbated the problem. For example, the 100 per cent salary increase of 1975, tagged the Udoji Salary Award, was disastrous to the economy as prices increased by more than 100 per cent. The payment of a year's arrears of the increase in salary further worsened the situation.

The exchange rate regime encouraged imports. The economy was heavily dependent on imports; almost everything was imported, from toothpicks to toothpaste dispensers. There was no serious attempt to invest the windfall from oil in viable projects. Except for the huge expenditures on education and construction of dual carriage highways in some parts of the country, Nigeria would have had nothing to show from the oil boom era. The industrial sector also depended on imported inputs, machinery and raw materials. Hence, the so-called manufacturing and mining industries (using 1972 as the base year), which indicate remarkable increases, appear misleading. The manufacturing sector increased by 82.2 per cent between 1972 and 1976 and by almost 94 per cent between 1972 and 1977.

The increases must be interpreted with caution, if industrialization is seen to imply the process of developing the capacity of that country to master and locate, within its borders, the whole industrial production process, namely production of raw materials, production of intermediate products for other industries; fabrication of the machines and tools required for the manufacture of the desired products and of other machines and tools, skills to manage factories and to organise production processes.

Declining oil revenues, disequilibrium in the balance of payments, growing unemployment, increasing rate of inflation and political instability, all confirmed that demand-induced policies were no longer effective. By 1978, a country which had thought that foreign exchange was not a constraint on development went borrowing on the Euro-dollar market.

Despite the oil boom, the private sector remained weak. The existing macroeconomic policies continued to encourage consumption rather than production. The economy was consuming what she was not producing. The austerity measures introduced by the military administration under General Olusegun Obasanjo were short-lived because structural problems were not addressed. GDP, which grew at 10.5 per cent in 1976 declined by 5.7 per cent in 1978 and grew by only 5.9 per cent in 1979. Consequently, the economy entered the recessionary phase, requiring further stabilization measures to reverse the gloomy situation.

Between 1978 and 1986, except for 1979 and 1985 when GDP showed positive growth, the economy continued to register negative growth rates. There were also high inflation, high unemployment rate and fiscal imbalance. The stabilization and austerity measures of the Shehu Shagari regime (1979-83) did not arrest the deepening crisis.

The balance of payment did not improve. There was an increase in external loans which further accelerated the debt over-hang situation. It was clear that the economy was suffering from stagflation.

The country's industrial capacity utilization, which was 73.6 per cent in 1981, declined consistently during the period such that by 1989, it was 31 per cent. Manufacturing, which grew at 14.6 per cent in 1981 reduced to 3.2 per cent in 1989. This poor performance occurred despite various stabilisation policies of the 1980s. The structure of the economy made it vulnerable to external shocks and policies.

The problems were so severe that restructuring of the economy was inevitable.

Consequently, a comprehensive economic reform package was introduced in 1986. The package aimed at changing and realigning aggregate domestic expenditure and production patterns so as to minimize dependence on imports; enhance the non-oil export base, and bring the economy back on the path of steady and balanced growth. Specifically, the objectives of the programme were designed, amongst others:

1.      to restructure and diversify the productive base of the economy in order to reduce dependence on the oil sector and on imports;
2.    to achieve fiscal and balance of payments viability;
3.    to lay the basis for sustainable non-inflationary or minimal inflationary growth; and
4.    To lessen the dominance of unproductive investments in the public sector, improve the sector's efficiency and intensify the growth potential of the private sector.

Some of the policy measures adopted in pursuance of these objectives were:
A. adoption of a realistic exchange rate policy;
B. further rationalization and restructuring of tariffs in order to aid the promotion of industrial diversification;
C. improved trade and payments liberalization;
D. reduction of complex administrative controls simultaneously with a greater reliance on market forces;
E. adoption of appropriate pricing policies, especially for petroleum products and public enterprises; and
F. commercialisation and privatization of public sector companies.

The economic reform programme appeared to have intensified speculative and trading activities rather than increasing production. The proliferation of merchant banks, finance houses, de-regulation of interest rates, privatization of the economy and the new industrial policy did not bring in the needed foreign direct investments. The private sector did not live up to expectations, despite the then favorable environment. During structural adjustment, the private sector was supposed to serve as an engine of growth. Rather sadly, after eight years of structural adjustment measures, the private sector was not able to respond adequately to the desire for increased production, employment and stable prices. The share of manufacturing in GDP was still low, while capacity utilization was a little above 30 per cent.

Essentially, the performance of the Nigerian private sector vitiated the major assumption that underlies an IMF adjustment programme to the effect that the private sector has the capacity to respond to supply-side incentives. Regarding privatization and commercialization, the public utilities had taken them to mean increased prices without corresponding efficiency and productivity. The unjustifiable price hikes (sometimes in the range of 500-2000 per cent) compounded problems for the industrial sector and the provision of social services.

The increased prices paid by consumers further reduced the latter's already declining real wages. It is not clear why imports were liberalized in an economy that was suffering from inadequate foreign exchange. The reform programme had sought to encourage export promotion, but traditional exports could not bring in the much-needed foreign exchange. Commodity prices fell and for a crop like cocoa, there was a glut in the market. Furthermore, the prices of export commodities were outside the control of the Nigerian economy.

Hence, eight years into the adjustment programme, non-oil exports remained insignificant. The persistent depreciation of the Naira vis-à-vis other major currencies created further distortions in the economy. The instability in the exchange rate created uncertainty and fuelled inflation. Indeed, there was a direct correlation between movements in the exchange rate and inflation. The external balance remained in disarray despite the devaluation of the domestic currency, while external debts mounted. The mismanagement of the foreign exchange market resulted in huge profits for the financial sector. This was due to the wide differential between the official and the parallel market rate. Consequently, there was a boom in the financial sector, although not in the other sectors of the economy. For example, there was paralysis in the real sector.

Manufacturers were unable to procure foreign exchange for their imports nor could they raise funds generally, given the high cost of borrowing money. While there was a fair consensus that the slice of the Naira needed to be halted, opinions on how best to stop the further decline of the domestic currency differed. There were those who preferred the intervention of government either in 'fixing' the exchange rate and/or creating a multiple exchange rate regime. This option could be likened to the system of import licensing with its attendant corruption. In the forex system, the banks and other financial outfits did not have a precise criterion for selling forex to their customers; hence, corruption.

Another opinion quarreled with the mechanism for determining the exchange rate. It argued that, the introduction of the Foreign Exchange Market (FEM) was improper and that what was needed; were minor adjustments for inflation which would have resulted in a variable exchange rate (the Naira), and urgent action to reduce the budget deficit.

The budget itself, it was suggested, ought to be prepared in both domestic and foreign currencies.

That way, government's use of forex would be limited to what is allocated to her in the foreign exchange budget. If government wished to use more forex, then its would obtain it from the forex market, like other economic agents. A reduction in the budget deficit, all things being equal, would increase investment, production and growth. The same scenario would have positive impact on external debts. A situation in which 50k out of N1 earned was used to service external debts could not help reducing the budget deficit.

The informal sector in Nigeria refers to economic activities in all sectors of the economy that are operated outside the purview of government regulation. This sector may be invisible, irregular, parallel, non-structured, backyard, under ground, subterranean, unobserved or residual. Informal economic activities in Nigeria encompass a wide range of small-scale, largely self-employment activities. Most of them are traditional occupations and methods of production. Others include such financial and economic endeavors of subsistence nature as: retail trade, transport, restaurant, repair services, financial inter-mediation and household or other personal services. Activities in the informal sector in Nigeria are difficult to measure; they are highly dynamic and contribute substantially to the general growth of the economy and personal or household income.

THE NATURE OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR
The informal sector in Nigeria may be categorized into the following sub-sectors:- (I) Productive; (ii) Service; and (iii) Financial sectors

(I) the Informal Productive Sub-sector: This sub-sector encompasses all economic activities involving the production of tangible goods. They include agricultural production, mining and quarrying (excluding petroleum), small-scale manufacturing, building and construction. Specifically, they manifest in food production, woodwork, furniture making, garment making, welding and iron works, among others.

(ii) Informal Service Sub-sector: This sub-sector includes repairs and maintenance, informal education services, health services, counseling services as well as labor for menial work. Repairs and maintenance services include tailoring, vehicle repairs and maintenance, tinkering, carpentry and servicing of various household and commercial tools. Informal health services, especially in the rural areas, include traditional birth attendants, herbalists and other traditional medical practitioners. There are also traditional spiritualists who offer counseling services. These services are rendered for fees paid to those who render them.

(iii) Informal Financial Sub-sector: The activities of this sub-sector are mostly underground, unofficial, irregular, informal, shadowy, and parallel. The most predominant type of informal finance in Nigeria is the Esusu. Among the Yoruba, it is called either Esusu or Ajo. Among the lgbo, it is called lsusu or Utu while the Edo calls it Osusu. The Hausa call it Adashi', the Nupe Dashi, the Ibibio Etibe, while the Kalahari call it Oku. Some Esusu groups operate with written laws while others operate with unwritten laws but on oath of allegiance and mutual trust. The general practice is that esusu associations contribute a fixed amount periodically and give all or part of the accumulated funds to one or more member(s) in rotation until all members have benefited from the pool.

In Nigeria, there are also informal money lenders, saving and credit associations and credit unions.

Money lenders are believed to be highly exploitative with high rates of interest through which they extract economic surplus provided by peasant labor, capital and land. The saving and credit associations as well as credit unions operate in more formalized ways than the esusu associations. They may or may not be registered under any legislation. However, savings and credit co-operatives must be registered under the Co-operative Association Act. Credit societies often come together to form larger units called credit unions, when they modify their operations to include subscription of share capital, deposit-taking and lending. Credit Unions are the precursors of the People's Bank.

ENHANCEMENT OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR
The Nigerian government at various levels has adopted policies aimed at enhancing the performance of the informal sector. For instance, policies have variously been designed to promote small and medium scale enterprises. Some of the policies include the following:

(a) Entrepreneurship Development Policy: Over the years, the Federal and State governments have played significant roles in entrepreneurship development. The Federal Government in the late 1980s initiated the Entrepreneurship Development Programme (EDP) run by the National Directorate of Employment (NDE). Under this policy, the Federal Ministry of Labor sought to address the graduate unemployment problem through the NDE programme which provided participants with the opportunity to acquire entrepreneurial skills and secure loan capital to enable them establish and operate their own small scale enterprises. The Federal Ministry of Industry has been in the forefront of efforts to promote the development and acquisition of entrepreneurial skills as part of its efforts to support Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). To this end, the ministry established Industrial Development Centres in various parts of the country with the mandate to:

(I) promote small-scale enterprises through the provision of extension services;
(ii) Train entrepreneurs and staff;
(iii) Assist with product design;
(iv) Process loan applications; and
(v) Render, free technical and managerial services including advice on quality control, product improvement, etc.

The state governments have also been involved in providing support to SMEs. Many states have Small Scale Credit Schemes which provide SMEs with financial and technical support. In the late 1980s, the Federal Ministry of Industry supported efforts by the states to build functional industrial estates for SMEs by way of partial reimbursement of money actually spent on the provision of industrial estates for SMEs. The "Work for Yourself Programme" (WFYP), a scheme introduced by the Federal Ministry of Industry and assisted by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the British Council, which aims to develop entrepreneurial skills in the sector, is one of such schemes being implemented with international assistance.

(b) International Financial Assistance: International organizations such as African Development Bank (ADB), World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have also supported efforts to aid the informal sector. In other cases, the Federal or State Governments, as the case may be, co-finance small-scale businesses which benefit from external financial assistance. Loans under the World Bank - Nigeria Small and Medium-Scale Enterprises development programme provide financial and technical assistance to these groups of entrepreneurs. For example, the Technology Incubator Scheme was promoted and executed by the Lagos State Ministry of Commerce and Industry, with UNIDO's financial and technical assistance and supported by the organized private sector in Lagos State and the Federal Government. The scheme was designed to promote the development of technology based SMEs in Nigeria . This objective could not be realized essentially because of the management style of the Abacha regime. It is most desirable that the scheme be revived.

(c) Family Economic Advancement Programme: The Family Economic Advancement Programme (FEAP) was initiated in 1997 as a catalyst to stimulate and encourage the growth of the informal sector. The programme is intended to harness the potential in the local areas to establish viable enterprises and projects that would ensure economic empowerment of the rural and urban poor. The programme was aimed at capacity building and providing credit support especially to its target group of the rural and urban poor. In order to ensure efficient management of FEAP's credit scheme, People's Bank and some commercial banks were chosen to participate in the scheme. To encourage the participation of the banks in the scheme, government granted them certain fiscal incentives. A tax exemption on interest income received on loans granted under the scheme was one of such incentives. FEAP is one of the programmes which the Obasanjo Administration intends to abolish as part of its restructuring of the institutional framework for the support of SMEs.

(d) Monetary Policies: The monetary authorities prior to the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme, directly managed and determined interest rates and sectoral allocation of credit by the banking sector. This generally, at least in theory, was favorable to SMEs since the interest rates were relatively low and stable. However, with the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme and the deregulation of the banking sector, interest rates and sectoral allocation of loans have become increasingly market determined. SMEs, therefore, no longer benefit from preferential monetary policies.

The Federal Government, in response to this, has continued to provide support for the informal sector by programmes designed to enhance the access of SMEs to credit and the availability of credit. Thus, the People's Bank and FEAP were established essentially to service the credit needs of the informal sector. In order to mobilize savings in local communities to finance the infomal sector, the Community Bank scheme was also introduced in the late 1980s.

The Role of the Informal Sector in Nigeria's Economic Growth: The informal sector plays the following important roles in the growth and development of the Nigerian economy:

(I) provides productive outlets for a large number of people who prefer or have to be self-employed. This sector, therefore, contributes to the national economy in terms of output and employment;

(ii) Provides competition in the economy;
(iii) Provides outlets for experienced specialist manpower from the medium and large scale enterprises who wish to be self-employed, using minimal capital;
(iv) Reduces the level of unemployment, though many such employed could be underemployed;
(v) Stimulates and enhances innovation and adaptation; and,
(vi) Helps in the mobilization of capital and human resources which would otherwise have been laid waste and idle thereby increasing the utilization of virgin reusable materials.

The contribution of the informal sector to the growth of the Nigerian economy is quite significant. The informal sector is better placed to absorb unutilized resources which the public sector and the organized private sector are not willing or able to use. Moreover, through linkages with large-scale enterprises, informal sector enterprises have the production base of the economy.

The informal sector contributes significantly to national economy in terms of output and employment. The government must encourage and empower the informal sector through the provision of conducive policy and physical conditions.Some gains were undoubtedly achieved during the period of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). However, the programme brought about number of problems, some of which were unbearable for the populace. Actually, SAP was intended to be a long-term programme which would gradually restructure the economy and set it on the path of stability and sustainable growth. Unfortunately, the operators of the programme lacked commitment to its long-term achievable goals. The programme was hastily implemented and this brought about endemic inflation, shortage of foreign exchange, increased unemployment, low capacity utilization, fiscal deficit and an overall degeneration of the poverty situation in the country. This made an immediate review of the policy imperative.

The dual exchange rate regime was introduced in 1995 as an attempt to redress the continued depreciation of the domestic currency. The essence was to achieve a stable and realistic value for the Naira. As a follow up action, the Central Bank of Nigeria, in 1996, intervened in the operations of the autonomous market to ensure that it was adequately funded. Between 1994 and 1998, real GDP grew steadily from MI 01.0 billion to N113.0 billion. The annual growth rates were 1.3 per cent in 1994, 2.2 per cent in 1995, 3.3 per cent in 1996, 3.8 per cent in 1997 and 2.4 per cent in 1998. Given the estimated population growth rate of 2.83 per cent, the GDP growth rate of 2.4 per cent in 1998 implied that the average Nigerian citizen was worse off in terms of well-being than in 1997. In terms of per capita income, there was fluctuation in this index of welfare between 1994 and 1998.

Perhaps, a contributing factor to this dismal picture was the contractionary monetary and fiscal policy measures adopted by government, due in part to IMF and World Bank initiatives for reduced public expenditure in the economy. In 1994, the value of output per head of the population was about MI, 053. It reduced to MI, 047.0 in 1995, rising marginally to about MI,051.0 in 1996. The figures for 1997 and 1998 were MI ,081.3 and MI ,078.4, respectively. During the period of guided deregulation, and despite efforts by government and the private sector to redress the situation, there was still high unemployment. The published unemployment rates were of 3.2 per cent in 1994, 3.8 per cent in 1996, 2.6 per cent in 1997 and 14 per cent in 1998. The general consensus among economists and various social commentators was, however, that the rates of unemployment were far higher than the true ones published. The Nigerian economy was not able to create enough employment opportunities for citizens who were able and willing to work. Moreover, an adequate environment was not created for self employment.

The result was increased discomfort suffered by many Nigerians as indicated by the discomfort indices.

The inflationary situation during this period was chequered. The rate of inflation rose from 57.0 per cent in 1994 to 72.8 per cent in 1995, but fell to 29 per cent in 1996. It reduced drastically to 8.5 percent in 1997, but rose marginally to 9.5 per cent in 1998. Prices were therefore generally unstable during the period of guided deregulation. The improvements recorded in 1997 and 1998 might have been due to the demand management strategy of government, whereby demand was suppressed through the payment of poverty wages and salaries, and due to reduction in government spending generally. However, if the economic fortunes of Nigeria must improve, then the perennial problems of the exchange rates, inflation, unemployment, corruption and low capacity utilization must be tackled.

CONCLUSION
The Nigerian economy appears to have performed well during the 1960s as shown by GDP growth rates, rates of inflation and unemployment. During the period, agriculture was the main stay of the economy despite fluctuations in export prices. The oil boom period witnessed remarkable growth rates.

Yet, the boom had no impact on the real sector since the industrial sector remained relatively weak. The windfall from oil appeared not to have been utilized in shoring up the industrial sector. Therefore, when the recession of the 1980s set in, the economy found itself unable to absorb the shocks from declining oil prices. The subsequent economic reform programme, even after 12 years, still had serious problems.

Nigeria's economy remained such that real wages could not meet basic requirements. Social services deteriorated at an alarming rate and the real sector was not linked to the so-called boom in the financial sector. The recovery was yet to emerge, even by the end of the period under review.

Nonetheless, given the country's solid resource base, the commitment of its new political and leadership class and given the appropriate policy mix, the economy may, in the near future, experience meaningful growth and development which can guarantee a high standard of living for the citizens.

The present democratic dispensation certainly offers some hope, if only the economy is properly managed.

The challenges confronting the Nigerian economy in the 21st Century are diverse and enormous. The unacceptable state of Nigeria 's economy is most galling given Nigeria 's enormous endowments of natural and human resources. This is more so given the fact that Asian countries, such as Singapore and Malaysia, with similar colonial heritage and attributes attendant thereto, and similar natural resource endowments, have recorded significant successes in the development of their economies since 1965 when they were at par or even behind Nigeria.

Singapore, some 30 years later had a per capita income of some US $10,000; whilst that of Nigeria was US $300. Nigeria 's economic decline, especially during the last 20 years is illustrated by the fact that per capita income, which was US $1000 in 1965 had declined to US $300 by 1998. Within some 18 years, Nigeria had declined from being a low middle income country and amongst the fifty richest countries in the world to one of the 30 poorest.

The major causes of the decline in Nigeria's economic fortunes have been political instability and bad governance, most especially in the 1990s. Military rule in Nigeria, as has been the case in most other countries with prolonged military rule, led to economic and social stagnation and decline. Similarly, the advent of an elected government at the dawn of the 21st Century after almost three decades of military rule should afford Nigeria the opportunity to arrest the decline in her socio-economic development and embark on economic revival.

The Yar’Adua’s Administration pledged to provide efficient, transparent, honest and democratic governance, through the Vision 20:20-20 to facilitate and enhance the process of reviving the Nigeria's economic fortunes pursuant to the Administration's economic programme.

Brain power is already emerging as the major engine of economic growth world-wide. This is true of both developing and developed countries. In India, for instance, the export of computer software as of 2009 was already in excess of U.S. $2 billion and is set to become India's largest export industry before the end of the first decade of the 21st Century.

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